The is/ought gap, - A meta-ethical position

The Is/ought gap (otherwise known as the 'fact/value distinction') is an argumant in meta-ethics. The Is/ought gap states there is a distinction between 'is' statments (or 'facts') and 'ought' statments (or 'values'). So 'is' statments are propositional while 'ought' statments are moral judgements (i.e. statments made up of a moral property such as 'good', 'bad', 'just', 'unjust', etc. That give a negative or positive ethical judgement). In other words, 'facts' tell us what 'is' while 'values' tell us what we 'ought' to do.

An 'is' statment can either be true or false. Such as 'Snow causes heart attacks' or '21 + 3 = 24' while 'ought' statments suggest a course of action. Sometimes this can be more implicit (i.e. Kevin is an evil man) but they are making a recomendation none the less (i.e. Kevin should not act in the way he does).

When people use moral argumants, it can be frequently seen that people use 'is' statments as reasons for holding 'ought' statments. They suggest that there is a nessasary connection between facts and values. For example, the moral judgement 'theft is wrong' could be argued for by pointing towards particular propositional statements about theft. For example, facts regarding the effects it has on people.

Supporters of the is/ought gap however argue that this moral reasoning is an error. They claim that there is no connection between 'facts' and 'values' as a 'is' does not imply an 'ought'. So we cannot express a nessasary derivation from facts to values.
For example, a virtue ethist would argue that if a character trait is fufilling, then it is good and we should be this way. However, someone using the is/ought gap would claim just because something is fufilling, does not mean we should poscess it.

If it is a question about happiness being a good thing, they could respond by saying 'people like being fufilled' or 'it is human nature to respond negitively when life is not fufilling'. To this it can be responded 'why is this good' and 'what's wrong with that'. So facts used to justify morality will be questioned with the same manner.

To illustrate the is/ought gap further, we might agree on the following propositions:

'Healthy food contains vitamin C'
'Oranges contain vitamin C'
'Oranges are healthy foods'

However, if these propositions are presented in the style of premises in an argumant, it cannot be said that any moral judgement can necessarily be derived from these of a logical conclusion - such s 'we ought to eat oranges', or even 'we should not eat oranges'. No 'ought' can be taken from an 'is'. While we can dispute and test the truth or falsity of factual statments, it is argued that we cannot do the same with value judgements.

Edited by ex nihilo - 7/2/2012, 20:15

It has been obvious for some time that you do not understand the is/ought gap. Since you frequently adduce it in your posts I am glad you have raised it here. Now we have an opportunity to explore what it means.

First: the argument in the is/ought gap is not as you portray it. It is more usually rendered as "you can't get an "ought" from an "is". There is a reason for that. What is being said is that you cannot deduce a value statement from a factual one. And that is true. But that does not mean that you cannot adduce facts in support of a value judgement. Indeed I would argue that one must.

Second: you use the example of "theft is wrong". To which the reply is "the clue is in the word". Theft is itself a value term, not a factual one. You are perfectly correct that one might support the judgment by using factual propositions such as you describe. There is nothing at all wrong with that: it is necessary if one wishes to explore the meaning of the word. As I said in your other thread about another crime: theft is a legal as well as a moral term. Depriving another of his property is not always theft: for example, the imposition of a fine through a legally constituted court is not theft. Depriving him of it by picking his pocket is theft. But in both cases we take someone else's property: the moral judgement of that action is not dependent on that fact. It is certainly dependent on some other facts, such as what the law says.

Asking for reasons for a moral judgement is not at all precluded by the is/ought gap: it requires them. But that is not what you seem to be suggesting: rather you suggest that the questions cannot be answered and therefore there can be no fact or reason base for a moral judgement: I think that is not true. But whether it is true or is not true it is nothing to do with the relationship between facts and morals

If I have used the term in my argumants incorrectly, then I am sorry. That is why I am putting it up here. It is probably best if you point these flaws out to me before hand (unless you feel there is a need not to).


In support, yes. But wouldn't that be more emoutinal appeal then anything else? It would not mean that an ought statment such as 'theft is wrong' is true just because we use factual statments such as 'it causes people pain' to back it up. We could say that in a particular culture, theft is considered to be wrong and this is true (i.e. that people think it is wrong) but this does not make 'theft is wrong' a universal moral truth, one can argue.


The thing I was trying to point out here was people can treat moral judgements as facts, and therfore moral truths.


The aim is to demonstrate one meta-ethical position to see if 'moral truth' is possible or not. Perhaps I should of stated this earlier.

Edited by ex nihilo - 7/2/2012, 22:06

1. Why would it be an emotional appeal? It is precisely the opposite: it is a reasoned position, as I see it.

2. You are still using "theft" as if it was a morally neutral term: it is not. It is value laden. "Theft" is by definition wrong, always and everywhere. That is what I have been trying to show, and what Vninect also demonstrates. If you can argue that "theft is wrong" is not true, then please do so: I think a tautology is true by definition; and I think it is a tautology. Different cultures define what constitutes "theft" differently. But that is quite a different matter.


Please give an example of what you describe. I know this is often said in philosophical circles: but I struggle to find a real world example outside of those circles, so an illustration would be helpful.

[QUOTE=FionaK,8/2/2012, 02:40 ?t=49811963&st=0#entry346782677]


Mistake on my part. I thought we were talking about moral truth. We can make reasoned positioned on things like you said, but whenether we can count those conclusions as 'moral truths' is a diffrent matter.


In many cultures it is value laden, true. We do not however know if theft can be considered a neutral or even positive trait for someone to have in certain cultures, so we should not automatiucally assume it is universal because we have a variety of diffrent cultures in diffrent enviroments which has shaped their customs and ways of life.

Just becuase the statment seems propositinal anyway, does not mean it is a recomdation none the less. That we shouldn't steal. Therefore, we cannot say if 'theft is wrong' is a true or false statment because it is nothing more then a value that people share, that we should not steal.

Also, were does it say that by definition theft is wrong anyway? I believe here that it is implied theft is wrong. This is not enough to be considered a fact unless we were to say that 'In ours and many other cultures theft is considered wrong.' What makes theft wrong in the first place, may I ask you?


If someone says 'murder is wrong' they treat this moral judgemant as a fact. But this is nothing more than a value disguised as a fact. We are saying nothing more than 'We ought not to murder'. We could also ask what makes murder wrong in the first place? Saying by definition it is wrong doesn't really work for me, as that seems it doesn't give a premises to show how it is wrong. I will need further explenation.

The point is that if the deprivation of property is not wrong it is not theft. By definition. Similarly with murder. Taking someone's life for reasons which are acceptable is not murder. That is why it is tautological. It is in the nature of the terms

So I could suggest deprivation of property is not wrong becuase it is theft. If a particular culture gave it a particular positive quonatation of being good or positive in the ethical sense? Same with murder?

I don't understand the question

Perhaps it is better if we restart the conversation. I did not want to get particually into a argumant on this and neither I or you seem to understand what we're getting at. I just wanted to know really if you do and do not agree on this position and why? Also what faults it may have?

Not meaning to be acrimonious at all, ex nihilo. Sorry if it has come across that way.

I do not know what you mean. I say that in all honesty. You say what you want to know is if I agree on "this position". To which I can only say "What position"

I assume you are referring to your last post and I said I do not understand the question. I genuinely don't. You said


Deprivation of property is not always theft: I have already used the illustration of imposition of a fine. That is deprivation of property, and it is not theft. Theft is value laden: where something is so characterised it is, by definition, wrong. That is what the word means. "Theft" is wrong, is a tautology: but I put the word in scare quotes to emphasise that, if that helps. I do not know how else to put what seems to me to be a self evident point, sorry

Sorry, I think I implie without knowing it. Basically if this position is a good or bad position for determining moral truth or not.

I say again: what position?

Maybe it will help if I repeat my own position?

As I see it the proposition that "one cannot derive an ought from an is" is a question of logic. I do not see anything to disagree with in it. Your late edit in the OP gave the example of oranges. You made a number of factual statements and you then went on to say that none of those factual statements can lead to the position that one ought to eat oranges. This is where I disagree and where I think you do not understand the is/ought gap in the same way I do. And this is because you avoid the notion of moral reasoning, for want of a better term.

I cannot think of a real world example where the is/ought gap is elided. I asked if you could give one because you say it is common: so that should not be hard. I think your example of the oranges came after that, so perhaps it was an answer to that request: I have said before that editing your op is not helpful, because I don't always go back to it and so I was not instantly aware you had edited significantly, and may have missed what you intended as an example. But if you meant it so I do not think it is an example at all.

The statement "oranges are good" is an "is" statement. If I then say that means you ought to eat oranges, then I have leapt the gap, since there is no explicit logic to my position. If you are concerned about the is/ought gap then the response is properly "Why" as you pointed out in your OP. But if I then say "oranges contain fibre and vitamin c: and they are readily available and cheaper than other sources of those things: and fibre and vitamin c are good for your health" then I have reasons for my "ought". The example is not all that useful because my recommendation that you ought to eat oranges is not actually a moral statement at all, in my view. It is a matter of taste and custom and sensible eating, to me. I can believe that my recommendation is wise but leave you free to make your decision having provided you with relevant factual information.

But let us suppose that if you do not eat oranges you will die. If there is no other source of vitamin c, for example, you may well get scurvy if you do not eat them. In that case I may take a moral position such that you "ought" to eat oranges and I may be prepared to impose sanctions on you if you do not. My moral prescription is not based on "oranges are good" with no further reasoning. If that is all I have to say then I have jumped the gap. But if my position is based on medical fact; coupled with the fact that your family will have no income if you die of scurvy, and the burden of supporting them will fall on me and others if you do not eat oranges, then the is/ought gap is not the basis of my moral position.

There are competing values: there is your freedom to choose your diet, for example. But my right to expect you to take reasonable action to enable you to support your family is worthy of weighing in those scales. If I take the view that your freedom is constrained by the consequences of the choices you make, for me, that is not deriving an "ought" from the facts of oranges. It is a much more complex calculation and I do not think the gap is in play at all.

There are real world problems of this sort: there has been debate about whether people should be sanctioned if their children are obese, for example. As a society we tend to rely on persuasion rather than coercion in this kind of situation: and that is because we value freedom highly and so health is not automatically trumps. And that is again why I struggle to find a real world example: I just don't think we ordinarily reach our moral conclusions without thought: we are reasoning creatures, after all.

Edited by FionaK - 8/2/2012, 12:36

Perhaps 'device' is a better word?

I do not think so, ex nihilo. It just changes the question to "what device" ?

Is the is/ought gap is a efficant device for finding or dismissing moral truths (if such things even exist). Would you call the is/ought gap a device, or something else? What would you call it and what would it be good at or bad at doing?

Is this any better (I presume not)?