Descriptive relativism, Nomantive relativism and Moral absolutism

Descriptive relativism is a term used to refer to the existance of moral disagreements between cultures or individuals.

At this level, it can be argued that one of the arguments is true, while the other false. After all, just because there is disagreement on the topic does not mean that neither party is right or wrong. If we were to take the example of evolution here. Two distinct parties could have diffrent views on how the process occured. One of them here it can be argued will be true in their beliefs, while the other false. The fact that people disagree on the matter does not conclude that no one is mistaken on the matter.



Normative relativism is the meta-ethical theory that if a culture makes a moral judgement, that judgement is true at that particular time.

This theory has been known to take the nomantive position that we should not say that a moral practice of anouther culture is right or wrong, as the action that is right or wrong depends on a culture moral system. So culture X could believe that drinking is morally acceptable while culture Y condems the practice. Both are true only in their paticular culture at that particular time. Consiquently, we cannot meaningfully use the standards of our society or appeal to universal standards to judge a diffrent culture (or so it is argued).

Nomative relativism is a form of non-cognitivism, but on a social level. They argue that absolute moral truth and morality are just expressions of culture. However, for individual people there is moral truth. This is defined by their culture. Reltivism does not make morality subjective (i.e. on the personal view of an autonomous individual), but relative to the culture. It does not deny that people can act wrongly, but claim it is only true if it is condemed in a particular culture which at the time views the action as morally wrong. A Normative relativist claims that you could not judge something outside a culture.

Therfore, an individual who keeps slaves in ancient Greese would not be judged in the same way as someone who kept slaves in mordern day Ohio. Further more, an anti-slavery Roman citizen would be wrong in their views, as they go against their own cultural values.

Noumative relativism can be described as an anti-realist moral theory, as it is argueing that ethical propities such as good and bad do not actually exist in themselves. They are simpley terms used to describe used to express the view of diffrent cultures.

Broadly speaking, it can be argued that normative relativism is claiming that - against the is/ought gap - there is a connection between facts and values. For example:

If Canadians view that homersexuality is morally wrong in 1886 - ('is' statment)
It is true that in Canada during 1886 homersexuality is wrong - ('ought' statment)

But it should be noted that moral truth is relative, and only applies to a particular culture at the time.


Moral absolutism is the view the view that there is such a thing as universal moral values.

A moral absolutist would argue that their are such things as moral truths that exist outside cultural boundries and are universal, and that everyone is accountable to these truths. It is important to note however that they do not claim to know that their own personal views are true, it is just the belief that moral knowledge is possible. This is diffrent from saying that their own moral views are true.

Edited by ex nihilo - 5/2/2012, 18:57

I am not sure what you want us to do with this, ex nihilo? Are you just interested in setting out different moral positions?

Nothing particularly. Just say if you agree, disagree or have some critisism. I suppouse here I am just intrested in setting out diffrent meta-ethical positions like you said. I'm not agreeing or disagreeing with them. Just curious to see what you guys think and if you find any flaws with these positions.

Well I am a moral absolutist. I think everyone is, actually. The reason is that morality is, by definition, normative. If an issue is not normative it is a matter of taste or manners, in my view.

Can you elabroate on that a bit (sorry)?

Well it is the defining feature of a moral view that it is generalisable, is it not?

What I mean is that it is not the kind of thing on which one can agree to differ. Say a society thinks that it is absolutely morally required to sacrifice the first born child in every family in order to ensure the sun rises every day. This is a moral position. If the sun does not rise then everyone starves. So they do it with a heavy heart and they mourn their dead just as you would: but there are no exceptions in this society. Every first born child is sacrificed. The practice is generalisable, and anyone who attempts to circumvent it is necessarily sanctioned: because they are harming everyone in the most profound way if they do not do what is required. The individual may not agree but it is not a matter of individual choice in this case. Such a people will take the child by force and sacrifice it: because they must. In other areas of life they have a prohibition against murder, as all societies do, I think. The law against murder is also predicated on a moral position, I would argue. But this is not murder, for murder is not only a moral characterisation: it is a matter of law. This does not fall within the legal definition of murder within that society.

Then imagine there comes into contact with that society another, which does not think that the sun will not rise if the first born live. This culture does think that such sacrifice is murder. Because the prohibition against murder is a moral position, not just a matter of law, the members of this culture are constrained to do something about it if they can. It is not possible to agree to disagree on matters of morality: they enjoin us to action.

The second culture can believe anything they like about the source of the moral difference: it makes no matter so far as the response is concerned. If they think they are descriptive relativists, they still think they are right and the others are wrong: which legitimises interference. If they are normative relativists they are also legitimised on the basis of Napier's argument about suttee:

""You say that it is your custom to burn widows. Very well. We also have a custom: when men burn a woman alive, we tie a rope around their necks and we hang them. Build your funeral pyre; beside it, my carpenters will build a gallows. You may follow your custom. And then we will follow ours."

And if they believe in absolute morality they are also constrained to act

In circumstances where there is agreement to disagree there is no moral content. If I come to your house for dinner and you eat with your fingers while I am used to a knife and fork we will not kill each other over the difference: it is a matter of manners, or taste, or custom. Sometimes we confuse the two and there is an issue of cultural hegemony: and there are grey areas. But I think there are central tenets which are truly moral. And I do not think there is any place or possibility for relativism there

I see. I think I know what your getting at now. Thank you.

I suppose I think you have that backwards. It seems to me that there are things which are known to be wrong. But we are clever: and we are good at self deception as well. Things are not simple in reality. For example, if it is wrong to take human life then we must decide what to do about someone who does that. It is an easy step to think we must kill such a person, if we honestly believe that his or her action is a threat to us all, as individuals or as a society. If we are nomadic jail is not an option. But there is an immediate constraint on the simple idea that taking the life of another is wrong, is there not? Yet the solution to that dilemma does not undermine the basic idea. Not all who kill are the same, either. A serial killer in the midst of a nomadic society allows of few responses. And so it may come about that we decide how we deal with that problem in different ways. Thus there is a cultural element to the legal or societal reaction, and thus "murder" comes into being: a moral principle, modified by what will eventually become a legal framework, if you like. But still the absolute wrongness of taking someone's life is intact, and I think it does exist in all cultures.

If that can be accepted, then the same processes apply to other circumstances too.
I do not think it is necessary to be naive in order to believe in moral absolutes. It is not a slogan. As I see it the fundamental principle creates a presumption when it comes to dealing with the problem: but the presumption can be overturned; and that is because there are competing principles. Thus it is not normally considered to be wrong to kill in self defence, nor in defence of another. But in each instance the presumption is that it is wrong to take another's life, and there must be a case made to rebut that. That case must rest on one of a few things: mostly on other principles, or on unalterable practicalities, I think.

Having said that, I think they are few. Much which masquerades as moral principle is nothing of the sort.