Some personal musings, Would you know a totalitarian movement if you met it

I was reminded of a thread I participated in on another board some time ago, and so, in parallel with the thread about when it is legitimate to oppose the law in a democracy I thought I would start this one: what are the defining features of a totalitarian movement and how would we recognise it in its early stages?

This seems important to me because there is some justification for comparing this period with the situation in the Weimar republic in the 1920's. There are, of course, differences and it is not right to form too close a parallel. But insofar as there is widespread dissatisfaction with the current state of politics and economics: and to the extent that this is leading to a great many alternative groupings and visions and stances vis-a-vis the rule of law I think it is not completely wide of the mark if we take a little time to consider what happens to make a democracy give way to totalitarian rule.

So the question is what should we be wary of? I would like your thoughts

Edited by FionaK - 13/9/2011, 05:03

I like that, I think he has most of the major signs covered; the selctive populism not least, which I see scary signs of in unexpected places (our Swedish Christian Democrats may indeed be democrats, but they are very close on most points.) I like his books, like his thinking, like his capacity for making me understand the world; wish there were more of him.

But the above is true for all totalitarian movements, isn't it? i was young once, a long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away, and had a brief flirtation with communism, and this kind of mindset was what made me cool off.

I was, I suppose, looking for an analytical tool of some description: a list would be handy.


Eco does have some interesting things to say: but I don't find it helps me all that much, actually. If I think about the list you have provided I don't get much further forward. I certainly agree that the mindset is eternal: but it is not just fascism per se: the problem is totalitarianism of all kinds and think there are different features at the level he is discussing.

1. The cult of tradition. I suppose that the crucial part here is the word "cult". There is not a lot wrong with tradition, to my way of thinking. At least, there is not any more wrong with it than there is with determined pursuit of novelty. I am inclined to think that there is some reason to believe we sometimes learn things: and that some traditions are a distillation of what we have learned by seeing what happens when we don't have it. The trouble is that these things accrete, and the reasons for them get lost. We take their beneficial effects for granted and do not always see how they are tied to the way we do things. I touched on that in the corruption thread, as it applies to a civil service. There are other examples. So I would say that a totalitarian outcome can attend the destruction of systems designed to contain certain evils: and that change for its own sake is dangerous too.

So if the opposition is between social change and inflexible tradition I do not think that totalitarianism is wedded to either one. It is true that there are extremists who seem to have a view of the past as a golden age: and that leads them to hanker after all those ancient virtues. But there are others just as wedded to the idea of a horrible past with lives "nasty, brutish and short": and for those people "progress" is a good thing in and of itself. Is the chinese cultural revolution a better thing than a platonic republic? I do not really think so. Eco was talking about fascism, certainly, and the elevation of tradition is perhaps central to that: but unless it becomes a thoughtless pursuit, with all the features of a cult, I am not sure it is an identifier in itself. It seems to me that the danger lies always in putting a system above and before the individuals who make up the society: and the outcomes are not that different, whether that is a cult of tradition or a cult of relentless modernity. And then we have the problem of defining a cult......

2. Rejection of modernism: I am not very sure why he separated this from the first, because it seems to me to be a subset, rather than a distinct feature. So for me what I have said above covers this, I think. It seems, in the use of the word "implies", that Eco agrees with that, so I will move on

3. Irrationalism. Eco seems to think that this is also a cult of some description: a cult of Action over Thought. I am not sure how the word cult can apply here. I do agree that there is danger in "distrust of critical reflection", but again I am not sure this is confined to one type of totalitarian movement: I am not even sure I think it is confined to totalitarian systems at all. Perhaps it is a feature, and we can describe an army, or a hierarchical church, or even a factory, as totalitarian: indeed that is often done. But it is a rhetorical device, I think, and it does not help. If everything is totalitarian, then nothing is: and what I am looking for is something which will help to identify such a movement and distinguish it from other things. I think that all churches are irrational: but I do not think they are all totalitarian, at all times, and in every place, no matter the denomination. It is hard to see the Society of Friends (quakers) as a totalitarian organisation, for example. Similarly, the ordinary soldier is not encouraged to think: he is trained to obey orders without question (within the limits of unlawful orders etc, but the point still holds for the most part I think). An army is hierarchical, but that does not make it totalitarian, because it is structured that way for a rational reason. So what is the divide here? If the majority of members of an organisation are not to think, is it saved from totalitarian character by the "exo brain" - which means, in the case of an army, political control outwith the hierarchical structure? Perhaps. I think perhaps I am confused by the lack of elaboration, because as I think about this I do not see the relationship between the will to action without reflection, and irrationality. Maybe that need to be teased out a bit

4. Disagreement is treason. I have no quarrel that that is sign of the totalitarian mindset. I do not think that contrasting it with science helps, though I know it is fashionable to draw the lines that way. But the nazis had very fine scientists, and their approach does not seem to have helped in any way. In short I do not think it is scientists alone who praise disagreement as a way to further knowledge: all non totalitarians do that. However I do think that the insistence on conformity is another feature of cults.

5. Appeal against intruders does seem to me to be a central feature. There must be an "other", and that "other" must be a threat in some way. Is it inherently racist? I am not convinced by that. I think the other can be a different race: but it can equally well be an "underclass", or "the capitalists/counter revolutionaries", or any group which challenges or threatens the values and analysis: or can be portrayed as doing so. The essential thing is that there must be a "us" and to inculcate that there must also be a "them".

6. Appeal to frustrated middle classes. Arguably this overlaps with 5. to the point of collapsing them into the same thing. But I think he is referring to the conditions which must exist in order for this system to take hold. For me this is a chicken and egg thing. Eco appears to believe that the roots of the anxiety or fear must be there already, and the totalitarian exploits it. I think that is partially true. But I believe that the conditions can be manufactured. I am not convinced that they are manufactured by the totalitarians, though: I think they are beneficial to social groups which fall far short of that. Where I do agree is with his proposition that this one is one which can by itself allow a totalitarian mindset to "coagulate" around it. As with 5. it is a variation of "divide and rule": but I do not think those who manufacture those fears are aiming for totalitarianism: most of the time it is contained within limits which allow the powerful to maintain their position. That fails when totalitarianism emerges, as some of the businessmen and financiers discovered to their cost, after they helped Hitler to power. Some version of divide and rule is almost always present: the mechanism whereby totalitarianism clots around it is more obscure. Similarly for hard left revolutionaries such as Trotsky: they do not make the conditions: but they exploit them, and that thread of totalitarianism overtly adopts the view that things must get worse to produce a revolutionary situation. For them the middle class is not the target, however. Again Eco is talking about fascism, and he is probably right about the target class in that case: but the "middle class" is not the only one which can be exploited to produce totalitarianism.

7. Is yet another way of stating 5. and 6. It also overlaps with 1. I do not think there is enough difference to make this a separate thing, at present

8. Inconsistent presentation of the "enemy's" capacity. I think that is not unique to totalitarian systems: I think it is essential in all wars, for example: they must be evil enough to warrant a fight; and that means they must pose a real threat. They must be beatable: so they must in some sense be weaker than "us". I cannot really see that this is confined to totalitarianism at all and so I would leave it out

9. Life as permanent warfare is a feature I readily can accept. It follows from divide and rule, and from the construction of the "other" as a permanent threat. As you say, one cannot ever win. What I cannot see is how we can use this to identify such a movement in its early stages: and that is because this feature can never be openly avowed. The promise of victory MUST be held out because people will not fight an unwinnable war, I think. There has to be a utopian future they can aspire to when all of these evils are eliminated. Bright landscapes full of happy people, however that society is conceived.

10. Need and deserve a Leader/ elitism: I think that is intrinsic to right wing totalitarian systems but not to left wing ones (the outcome in practice is similar, but follows a different logic, I think). I do agree that this is an identifier for fascist type ideologies, and it sets off extreme alarm bells in my head when I come across it.

11. Educated to become a hero. Eco appears to tie that to thanatophilia, and I have certainly seen that proposed before. It is not new: it is part of the story of Achilles, and that is about as old as it gets. But it is not confined to the totalitarian mindset, I dont think. It is a feature of patriotism, for example. I do not see evidence that people are eager to die, though if they must then a heroic death is to be preferred at least by some. This narrative is pretty much universal in the education of boys, at least. So yes, eternal, but it co-exists with other narratives and they all exist in democracies too. That is in line with my own view that all (archetypal) narratives are there all the time. It may be that the totalitarian mindset elevates that one: but I do not think we can usefully use it to identify the emergence of such a system at an early stage

12. Devout herterosexuality. I don't think so. The will to power over the "other" covers this wrt the position of women. But I do not think this precludes homosexuality at all: in fact I think it probably promotes it. So here I disagree completely.

13 and 14 are unarguable I think and would certainly be high on my list.

As I mentioned in the book thread, I have been reading Polanyi's book the last couple of days. He has things to say about the conditions which give rise to right wing totalitatarian regimes, and I think it is interesting to compare what he has to say with Eco's list.

Polanyi is primarily concerned with the meaning of the self regulated market, in terms of what it adopts as a theory of human nature: and this naturally resonates with me, because I think that all social and political arrangements ultimately reflect some such theory. He further argues that the particular conception of that system necessarily results in the subordination of all human and social values to those of the market. We have seen that argued in other links in other threads: it is hardly unique to his analysis. But Polanyi also has much to say on the rise of fascism and nazi-ism and he makes some points I have not considered before.

Polanyi firmly takes the view that the roots of success for such movements are in the objective situation. He rejects localised explanations whether they are couched in terms of national character or in specific historical events, such as the impact of the Treaty of Versailles. In supporting that view he points to the emergence of right wing totalitarian movements all over europe and in other parts of the world in the 1930's: in very industrialised countries and in those which were not so "developed": in countries which had been on the winning side in the war and in those which lost: in countries of "aryan" origin and in asian states such as japan: in catholic and protestant and secular states: and in long established countries and newly constituted ones. There is nothing which one can point to which is common to those countries where the movement became strong, and particular to them. At least not in the background culture.

He further points out something I had not considered at all: according to Polanyi, there is no evidence that it should be described as a "movement" at all. We are apt to see the rise of that kind of power as dependent on widespread popular support: and in this we are perhaps influenced by footage of the Nuremberg rallies and such. But according to Polanyi this is a misunderstanding. Hitler did have a mass following; Mussolini only a small one; and Primo de Rivera had no following to speak of. They were all notably successful, and so he argues that, although they all aimed at mass support, their political effectiveness was independent of that.

Polanyi also gives a list: though since the identification is not his primary purpose it is less comprehensive than Eco's: and not so thoroughly argued. But he says that a country approaching a fascist phase does have some symptoms, and amongst these he included:

Spread of irrational philosophies
Racism
Anticapitalist demagoguery
Criticism of the party system
Heterodox views on the currency

Obviously some of those are common to Eco's list. I am not familiar enough with Eco's work to know if he considers the "eternal" existence of the fascist mindset needs a particular set of conditions to achieve power: nor do I know if Polanyi would agree that the mindset is eternal. But it is clear that some of what we should look out for is agreed by both. That has to be helpful in some ways, because none of those things are clearly and unambiguously bad on the face of it (with the exception of racism, if it is presented as such: but it often isn't). The very process of listing makes it clear that each element is easy to miss or dismiss: and so the detection of early stage fascism is never going to be automatic. After all, being fed up with existing political parties is fairly universal: and a wish to transcend them is attractive to many.

Another thing which I had missed is that in none of the 20th century instances of fascist success was there any actual revolution. While they presented themselves as radical popular movements, it is striking that the rebellion was a sham, at least insofar as it was never firmly put down by the exisiting powers. This is part of the common knowledge of the working class history I was brought up with: we all "know" that the british aristocracy was largely supportive of Hitler: and that some of them had to go and hide on their islands and estates once the war started, for they were recognised nazi sympathisers. But somehow I had never noticed the same was true everywhere. Whether they won or lost they had support in the ruling classes (whoever they might be) in a "plausibly deniable" way, which aimed to preserve their position whatever the outcome. The people were not fooled, or the parallel history I was taught would not exist, and the Spanish Civil war would not have happened: but it was enough. In contrast with left wing revolution, whether totalitarian or not, the case is different: there was real opposition to those movements wherever they arose. As soon as I say that it seems obvious: but I had missed it.

It is sometimes argued that fascism (using that shorthand here, but it stands for all the different right wing totalitarians: just easier to write ) was essentially nationalist in character: but again Polanyi disputes that, at least if nationalism is identied with patriotism: there were collaborationists, from Vichy to Quisling, and none of them were serving national or patriotic aims, as those terms are generally understood.

Polanyi locates the rise of fascism in the paralysis produced by the "double movement" of a the rise of the "Self Regulating Market" together with the societal defence of regulation which necessarily accompanied it. For him this reached impasse and when the economic system no longer functioned the conditions for fascism were in place.

I am not sure yet if he goes further: but I will. It occurs to me that the reductionism inherent in the notion of "economic man" is core to the rise of fascism. The "laissez faire" capitalists believed that everything was reducible to a commodity: they valued only profit and assumed that this was human nature: as now, they argued that their analysis "worked with the grain of human nature" and that it was rational/scientific: indeed it was a natural law. Such a conception denies the role of emotion and of social and personal relationships in the forming of human society: but to me those are part of our core. This is related to what I see as our dual nature: we are competitive and cooperative in equal measure (if you happen to focus on the group): or we are selfish and altruistic in equal measure (if you prefer to locate that kind of thing in the individual): so any system which seeks to deny either part will ultimately fail. So I think, anyway. But building on that idea, it also seems to me that when it fails the part which has been denied for any significant period will rebound in spades. It is no accident that the notion of economic man, with its attendant destruction of the dignity and pride of many, will, when it fails, produce rejection of its tenets: so will any system of that sort. But in that case the rise of mysticism and irrationality is to be expected: since their opposites were the hurrah words underpinning the theory which led to the bad outcomes. That does not mean we will fling out technology: we might, but we do like our comforts: it does mean that there is less resistance to those things which elevate the sense of value and belonging which the individualist free market denies, though. And some of those abstractions are scary: as is the abstraction of "economic man" itself

Someone on another board quoted this from the book "They Thought They Were Free" by Milton Mayer, about life in Nazi Germany: I reproduce it here in full because I think it is important and well expressed:

Upthread Vninect listed Umberto Eco's markers of totalitarianism. Someone has applied them to Mr Trump here:
http://www.alternet.org/election-2016/trum...tter1068417&t=2

Interesting

I've been thinking a bit about this approach because I do see the advantage of identifying specific actions which would help us, over more abstract general principles. If it can be done. But the more I look at the summary above, the less I am convinced by it.

I find the complacency in the opening paragraphs quite unjustified. The idea that fascism can not rise in a capitalist country is frankly peculiar, given that is precisely where it did arise in the past: at least if nazism is included in the characterisation. It is possible that the author confines his assertion to the US, but it does not read that way.

I agree that totalitarianism in not just any right wing position; but I am unclear if the authors mean to focus specifically on fascism rather than on totalitarianism more widely: or even other forms of right wing totalitarianism (assuming the left/right distinction holds, for this argument). The reference to Golden Dawn and to Syriza suggests it is not confined to fascism per se, I would suggest. So I am going to presume that they mean any right wing totalitarian position. If that is not correct please feel free to disagree. Your problem with the distinction is well taken: me too.

However if we do look at it more widely then I do not agree with their identifiers at all. As noted above, Polanyi makes a case that this is not in fact the mobilisation of a popular movement, often. It is in fact a noisy and dangerous minority in collusion with the ruling elites, more typically.

Nor do I agree that the totalitarian gives the domestic working class a higher standard of living than would be achieved under liberal democracy (whatever that is supposed to mean these days). They certainly promise it: but so do all politicians. Where is the evidence that they deliver?

Fascism per se did not eliminate the internal enemies: nazis certainly did, and Mussolini colluded to some extent: but that was not a feature of fascism in the way it was of nazism. Fascism was corporatism writ large: it was not particularly aggressive towards an identifiable "enemy within".

Ultimately all totalitarians abolish democracy: it is kind of the nature of the beast. But I don't think they do it overnight, nor start out by saying that is what they will do.

By now we see Mr Trump attacking the press and the judiciary. The authors say it is no part of his programme to abolish the mechanisms of democracy. With all my contempt for the captured media I still consider a free press to be a one such mechanism, at least ideally: and an independent judiciary another.

Basically I do not accept this author's conclusions. Where I do think he has a point is in identifying white supremacy as a particularly american phenomenon, which is certainly in play. If an american totalitarianism were to arise it would probably have that at the heart of the necessary "othering". But I see that as a tangential issue since the particular from totalitarianism takes is determined by local factors: it does not change its essence, I don't think.