www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/20...shift-austerityThis is an article on the dutch elections which are to be held today. It is not very informative and the bias is manifest in its description of radical austerity policies as "social reform". That is to be expected in the UK where such rhetoric is so entrenched as to be considered objective: and it may be that the same is true in the Netherlands, if the article's analysis of the political spectrum is right. It appears that, as in this country, the "socialists" have bought the neoliberal agenda and that is now considered to be the centre ground.
And that is what I wanted to talk about.
It is at least arguable that the neoliberal agenda is nothing more than laissez faire capitalism by another name:that is the position I take. If that is the case a number of interesting questions arise. As I see it that position, when in the ascendancy, leads to great divisions within society. All over europe that agenda was dominant in the past: and in particular from the end of WW1. It is an ideology which actually promotes the interests of corporations and the very wealthy: and that is always at the expense of the majority, so far as I can tell. That is, of course, not normally openly admitted: but when it is, the story is always that freedom from regulation and government interference will lead to increased prosperity for all: or for "the country", at least. That is not true. I do not think there can be any doubt that it is not true.
What occurred to me, though, was that the people are not fooled. Thus in the 1920's and 1930's there was a great polarisation in society: the left and the right rose and they had this in common:they both ascribed the misery of the population to that very ideology and its consequences. For the left the problem was capitalism: for the right the problem was the very wealthy cabal (often identified with jews or some other ethnic traitor group). The self described centre shifted to the right and we saw an uncompromising stance from those with wealth and power. In Germany they chose to support the hard right, on the basis they could control it (or so at least one story goes, and I think it has some merit): elsewhere that was not so true though there was a strong strand of support for the nazis amongst the elite in this country, and presumably in others as well). What was lacking was any spirit of compromise: left and right each had an analysis and they were increasingly at odds.
In the end this led to war. There are many factors in the genesis of war but for me the fundamental reason for it was the failure of the economic policy underpinning laissez faire. The crash of 1929 was pivotal: and the pursuit of austerity measures following that crash could not solve the inherent problems of the economic model. I have discussed that before and it is not really central to what I wish to say here: though the parallels are important.
My basic point is rather that after the war there was a consensus which was basically adopted throughout Europe. From one perspective social democracy is exactly that: a recognition that the interests of the wealthy do NOT coincide with the interests of the majority: and that this genuine and deep seated difference has to be accommodated. I think our forebears were clear sighted about that. The solution was to compromise. For this period of our shared history we behaved in a rather adult way. The wealthy retained a great deal of power, and the capacity to safeguard their position in terms of assets and income, on the back of that power: but not wholly. Other interest groups organised and they were able to ensure that there were limits to the concentration of wealth, and to the ability of the very wealthy to pursue their interests with impunity. As I see it all the different interests in society accepted the need for compromise: none would get all they wanted: but none would starve, and the "elite" would not lose all of their privilege, either. We could live with that.
Within the constraints of that consensus there were shifts in the balance from time to time: but the settlements reached were within well defined limits: there were regulations which ensured that workers could not be reduced to the condition of serfdom which obtained in many 19th C factories, for example. Safeguards against utter starvation, and support for those who suffered from the failures of the capitalist model as it went through its various "business cycles" etc meant that the poor could have some security and some dignity. The levels of support of course changed over time: groups previously unrecognised became conscious of themselves
as groups and there were hard negotiations over their rights. That can be seen in the history of feminism, for example. But all of those battles were fought within a framework of the post war consensus.
That has been abandoned. One thing I am convinced of is that where such a consensus exists it begins to be taken for granted after one or two generations. There are always problems and disatisfactions with the status quo: but such a framework is taken to be a "natural" order unless the principles are clearly elaborated and the history is known. "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance", it is said. But you have to know what to look out for: and we have forgotten.
Having forgotten, we have listened to the siren song of the right. They forget first: perhaps because the rich do not suffer from war in the same way as the rest of us, it does not go so deep into their mindset. Whatever the reason their interests are, and remain, different: and they pursue them as and when they can. So do we all, in the end. Therein lies the importance of the consensus: we have to know we are compromising, and why we are compromising: but that knowledge gets lost.
We currently have a narrative which says we are all on the same side: that is a narrative of the right and it is ironic, for there is no doubt that they have declared class war: austerity is not for them. One interesting consequence is that where their story is rejected they manage to convey the impression that the group which is in opposition is the one breaking the consensus: but they have already done that and what we see is increased polarisation: just as emerged last time we saw the mainstream promoting this faux unity.
In these circumstances there is always the temptation to refuse to compromise: and "sell out" is a dirty phrase for those who adhere to ideological or political purity. It is tempting, of course. I do not think it is in anyone's interest to demand they get all that they wish for, however. I honestly believe that our interests are so different that this must end in war: civil war if people retain a clear understanding of the problem: or international war if we are persuaded to blame these problems on some other group or nation.
What has that to do with the link at the start of this post, you may ask. Well I was led to these thoughts by the report that coalition may not be possible at this election: and the recollection of the difficulties Belgium had in forming a coalition after the 2010 elections. Both these states are constituted on some form of PR and it has worked well for many years. I gather that the people in those countries like that system and dislike fptp, for example. It occurred to me that this possibility rests on the consensus I am talking about. PR cannot work if there is no such consensus, and no recognition of the need for messy compromise within those limits.
In this country it was noticeable that once the neoliberal tendency gained their dominance, there was much talk of "thinking the unthinkable" and this was presented as an open and almost technocratic approach much in line with "scientism" and "pragmatism" and all of that. But what it really meant was the destruction of the basic premises on which that consensus was built. That is also what "there is no such thing as society" means, I think.
The post war consensus was not pure; not admirable in many ways. But it was unifying. We do not value it enough: we do not see the peril of refusing it. perhaps. But if we cannot form governments in its absence that, to me, suggests we need to radically rethink what we are about
