Phoenix/Scatter Hypothesis: Life after death?

You restate as "is death an end to life" and I don't see you have clarified really. Again it is not an end to any life: but it is an end to "my" life. That is what the word death means. It does not mean "beginning" and it does not mean "change": it means an end of the individual life. It follows that the individual self will not continue. I don't honestly see what you are getting at: but perhaps it is because I do not seem to understand your premises. Your next bit seems to suggest that too. To me it seems to merely restate the conservation of matter. Whatever is made is made out of existing matter and energy. Don't think anyone disagrees with that. So there is a new pudding or a new person, as Vninect said. But there is no other connection between those things and whatever went before: so there is no "old self" and "new self", because that implies that there is some connection beyond the mere reuse of materials. That is because the term "self" is carrying baggage, I think.

Change again: Is death final (as in a final unchangable state which cannot be changed, akin to the "eternal sleep" concept) or is death a [transition] from one form [of existance]to anouther? If one being dies, is there a conection to that one and anouther being created and will they be the same or entirely diffrent?

(Seems better to me, ambigous but better. If I'm going to go on though I should probably tell you what my aim is. I have met people who believe death is like an 'eternal sleep'. If you want to know what my goal is, it is to try to dismiss this view. I think if we start from here, we might be able to get somewere with this.)

Actually, I'm curious. What do you think happens after death?

Edited by ex nihilo - 1/1/2012, 06:46

As I already said: I think what happens after death is the same as what happens before birth. The individual consciousness is annihilated

There I agree, but another (not the as he individual consciousness, a new one) is created through a variety of diffrent parts from various other forms (including some of the parts that made the original self). The individual consciousness and self dosen't exist but the parts that made the self are still there and can be used to create new selves (that have no connection other than the material they are made from the origanal self, that is what a self 'is' after all. Nothing but a lot of complex machinery which can be taken down and re-esembled). At least that is what I believe. Conveying it though is harder than I thought. I probably haven't conveyed it right even now. Anyway, I've changed the intro again in the comment on top.

Though do you think I should stop this, I'm kinda worried that I'm annoying you with this as I tend to keep repeating myself.

First: it does not annoy me at all though I do find it hard to understand what you are getting at. I find changng the OP a problem because it does not seem to allow the argument to develop and I cannot remember what it used to be once it is changed, really. So for me it would be better to let posts stand and deal with any changes in subsequent posts: but as I said, that is personal preference.

I am not sure if you are repeating yourself because I am not sure what you are saying.

From the outset you do seem to agree that the individual is annihilated after death: and you say so again in this post. We do not seem to have any difference in terms of the conservation of matter, thankfully. It follows that everything which comes into existence is made of pre-existing matter and energy. The "parts", as you term them, can be used in the construction of a living thing of any type; or a non-living thing of any type. The problem for me arises when you refer to that later construction as a "self".

Let me try to explain my confusion. If some part of the matter and energy which is currently "you" is later used in making a rock, is it your contention that the rock thereby has a "self"? If that is what you mean it is a very curious use of the word "self". To me it is not reasonable to talk of a rock having a "self" because a "self", if it means anything, must mean the sense of personal identity. "Self consciousness", if you will. I do not think that rocks have that: and if they do I cannot see any way we can detect it. Since it is not detectable in any way, Occam's razor leads me to discount the possibility. This is very much the same position I take on God: there is no evidence for it; it is not demonstrable in any practical way; and the universe is not different if I include it or don't: so I discount it. I hope that makes sense to you.

If you accept that the use of some of the material which currently constitutes "you" does not confer a "self" on a rock, then I do not see how it could confer a "self" on anything else. But if I understand you correctly you seem to be saying that such material, incorporated in a new human being, would somehow generate a "self". There is a sense in which that is true but trivial, and that is what I mean by conservation of matter. A human being has a sense of "self" because of the way he or she is constructed. So it follows that all healthy human beings have this (and this is in line with all I have read and observed, though it is moot whether infants have it: I think it develops after birth at some point). If matter and energy are combined in a way that makes a healthy human, it is part of that combination that it produces a sense of self: and that is intrinsic, not to the bits of matter, but to their arrangement.

But that does not seem to answer your proposition and I am therefore led to believe there is something else behind what you are seeking to convey. My best guess is that you are suggesting that there is some continuity between your consciousness and the consciousness of the new human who has some of the same matter and energy which is you right now. That cannot be right, because you specifically say it is not right. But I am struggling to see what is left.

Then I get a bit lost, because although you specifically seem to say that is not what you mean, you also say in the post I am replying to that the "self" can be reassembled. And that seems to imply that you do indeed argue for at least the possibility of continuity. That makes no sense to me whatsoever.

I imagine that you are trying to say that in the course of infinite time there will at some point be a human being made of precisely the same matter and energy you are made of: and it will be arranged in precisely the same way. Then you presumably envisage that that human being will have the same sense of "self" that you have: yet that self will have no awareness of the "self" you currently are. At least that is what I take from your reference to "amnesia". This relates to the science fiction story I alluded to upthread, and it is why I introduced that. A number of questions arise from it which are relevant to what I think you are trying to say. I am now repeating myself as well, but I will try to elaborate in case that might help.

If you were faced with the opportunity to travel as I described, would you take it? This bears directly on the question of "self" because the story envisages that the newly created person at the distant location would in fact have the same sense of self as the one left behind. It follows that exactly the same arrangement of matter and energy, even using different material, would result in an identical replica including the sense of "self" and also the existing memories That is in fact an even closer replication than the one you seem to be suggesting. Yet if we left the original intact and just made a copy of that person, we are not comfortable with the notion it is the same person: and that is because we can see it is not. There are two bodies and this is very largely about counting heads. It follows that even if we destroy the original the second one is still not the same person. Because nothing has changed from the situation we have if we leave both in place. From this it follows that the sense of self is specific to the particular body.

You may then raise the objection that in the experiment it is not using the self same matter and energy: and that is true. Perhaps it makes a difference if we specify a slightly different machine, which dismantles your body into its component energy: beams that to the new location at the speed of light: then reassembles it. That is perhaps closer to what you are trying to imagine. Would you use that form of transport? Let us imagine for the sake of argument that this machine is infallible so there is no danger you will end up injured or in a different configuration.

If you believe that this is the same person after that process then there is no reason not to use that machine. And that is a perfectly reasonable position. But as you pointed out, this person died. From my point of view the new person is just that: a new person. It is not me, though it may not be able to detect that. And that is the crux of the matter. What emerges from the machine has a sense of self and there is no way to tell if that is identical to the sense of self which it had before it went through the machine. . There is nothing to compare it with. It could be very different but it would not feel different. From this it follows that the sense of "self" you have is the only one you have, and it is maybe unique and maybe not: in practical terms after you travel it does not matter, because you do not know if there is a difference and you will never know. But if there is then the "self" that is you has gone. Maybe that does not matter: but it is not something I would choose to do.

Not sure if that helps?

You've got a rough idea of what I'm trying to say. Some bits are close to what I am trying to say, but not exactley it. I'll probalbly have to continue this anouther time. If you don't mind, I would like to come back to this some other time. I need to probably reasearch a few things and terms before I come back and reconstruct my hypothesis.

There are a couple of other essays anyway that I would like to subbmit for scrutitny if you don't mind at some point?

You can post anything you like, ex nihilo, so long as it does not violate the Membership agreement

Thanks

Actually, I just want to confirm a few things quickly.

>Ok, so we agree on that death is what it is like before you are born and after you are dead, correct?
>And when we die the components that made us are scattered and form diffrent things.
>But because of this, we won't exist again [as individuals perhaps, because something else exists in our place maybe?]
>And death is not an eternal sleep.

Is this correct? Or do you want me to add a few things. I might have to start this again perhaps from the bottom up.